

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 280483
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:LRFLEISCHED

APPROVED BY:S/S-O:LRFLEISCHER

-----088334 230544Z /13

O 230316Z NOV 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 280483

NODIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR BRZEZINSKI

FOLLOWING REPEAT BONN 19419 SENT ACTION SECSTATE NOV 22.

QUOTE S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 19419

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO LONDON AND PARIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM GW FR US UK

SUBJECT: FOUR-POWER CONVERSATIONS ON SALT

REFS: (A) BONN 19418; (B) BONN 19263

BEGIN SUMMARY. FRG FOREIGN OFFICE POLITICAL DIRECTOR
BLECH HAS CLARIFIED FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY VEST THE
ISSUES THE FRG WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS IN THE PROPOSED
QUADRIpartite CONSULTATIONS. BLECH AGAIN URGED THAT
THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS TAKE PLACE NEXT WEEK,
BELIEVING THAT A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION WOULD BETTER
SHAPE THE FRAMEWORK FOR CONSULTATIONS BY FOREIGN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 280483

MINISTERS AT THE DECEMBER 7 QUADRIpartite DINNER.
END SUMMARY.

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VEST RECEIVED FURTHER
CLARIFICATION OF THE FRG PROPOSAL DURING
BILATERAL TALKS WITH POLITICAL DIRECTOR KLAUS
BLECH THIS AFTERNOON.

2. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE BLECH-VEST MEETING, BLECH RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM AMBASSADOR VON STADEN WHO REPORTED HIS CONVERSATION WITH ACDA DIRECTOR WARNKE SHORTLY BEFORE. ACCORDING TO VON STADEN, WARNKE HAD SAID HE DOUBTED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HOLD THE PROPOSED TALKS NEXT WEEK (THE FRG HAS SUGGESTED DECEMBER 1) BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE TIME FOR PREPARATION. WARNKE REPORTEDLY STATED THAT THE DECISION WOULD BE LEFT TO THE SECRETARY UPON HIS RETURN FROM LATIN AMERICA BUT THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE AN INITIAL EXCHANGE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AT THE DECEMBER 7 QUADRIpartite DINNER, FOLLOWING WHICH THE MORE DETAILED CONSULTATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE. BLECH STATED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT THIS PRELIMINARY POSITION TO FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND SEEK HIS REACTION. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HOWEVER, BLECH PROFESSED INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND WHY IT WOULD BE SO DIFFICULT TO BE PREPARED FOR TALKS NEXT WEEK.

3. VEST REFERRED TO THE AMOUNT OF PREPARATORY WORK REQUIRED FOR WARNKE'S BRIEFINGS TO THE NAC ON DECEMBER 2 BUT ADDED THAT IN LARGE PART THE US WAS PROCEEDING FROM AN UNCERTAINTY AS TO PRECISELY WHAT IT WAS THE FRG WISHED TO TALK ABOUT. HE COULD SEE MERIT TO THE IDEA OF HAVING THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 280483

DESIGNATE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DISCUSSION, WITH CONSULTATIONS THEN FOLLOWING UNDER A MINISTERIAL MANDATE. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THERE WERE VARIOUS AND SOMETIMES CONFLICTING IMPRESSIONS IN WASHINGTON AS TO DESIRED SUBJECT MATTER, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE CLARIFICATION OF THE GERMAN PROPOSAL.

4. IN RESPONSE, BLECH STATED THAT THE FRG HAS NO CLEAR-CUT POSITIONS. THE GERMANS ONLY KNOW WHAT THEY WANT AND WHAT THEY DO NOT WANT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES AND WOULD WISH TO MAKE THEIR VIEWS KNOWN AT A VERY EARLY STAGE SO THAT THE US COULD CONSIDER THEM WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ARE STILL IN PROCESS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS STEMMING FROM HEARING THE GERMAN VIEWS AFTER IT WAS TOO LATE FOR THEM TO BE CONSIDERED. THE BRIEFINGS THE USG HAS PROVIDED HERETOFORE HAD BEEN EXTREMELY VALUABLE, BUT THERE HAS NOT AS YET BEEN OPPORTUNITY FOR A REAL DIALOGUE ON SOME OF THE BASIC ISSUES.

5. BLECH THEN ENUMERATED FOUR MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST WHICH THE GERMANS WOULD LIKE TO TAKE UP IN QUADRIpartite

CONSULTATIONS:

-- THE CRUISE MISSILE QUESTION AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SALT III OF THE ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED. THE POSSIBILITIES AND THE STRATEGIC VALUES OF CRUISE MISSILES HAVE NOT YET BEEN COMPLETELY THOUGHT THROUGH BY ALL. THE CONVENTIONAL VALUE OF CRUISE MISSILES MAY INCREASE AS PRECISE TARGETING IS IMPROVED. WHERE WOULD CRUISE MISSILES FIT IN THE RANGE OF NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS, WHERE THERE IS A TREMENDOUS DISPARITY?

-- THE IMPLICATIONS OF PARITY AND EQUIVALENCE. HOW DO WE MAINTAIN DETERRENCE ONCE ROUGH EQUIVALENCE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED THROUGH SALT IN THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 280483

STRATEGIC FIELD, WHEN THERE IS NO PARITY IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD IN GENERAL AND NONE IN THE GRAY ZONE? HOW IS THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF THE GRAY ZONE -- THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE EURO-STRATEGIC BALANCE -- TO BE DEALT WITH? ("SALT" POSES A SEMANTIC ISSUE IN DEFINING AS STRATEGIC ONLY THOSE WEAPONS WHICH DO NOT AFFECT EUROPEANS.)

-- THE STRUCTURING OF SALT III, BOTH IN SUBSTANCE AND IN FORM. HOW IS THIS TO BE DEFINED IN SALT II? WHO WILL BE NEGOTIATING, AND ON WHAT? BLECH POINTED OUT THAT THE GERMANS HAVE NO INTENTION OF DEVELOPING "THE" EUROPEAN OPTION, AN IDEA WHICH WOULD MAKE NO SENSE. THEIR DESIRE, RATHER, IS TO DEFINE WHAT COULD BE EUROPEAN OPTIONS (PLURAL).

-- NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND NON-TRANSFER. NON-CIRCUMVENTION POSES NO PROBLEM AND IS ASSUMED AS A MATTER OF COURSE. BUT NON-TRANSFER WOULD BE DIFFICULT. WOULD IT RELATE ONLY TO SPECIFIC SYSTEMS COVERED IN SALT II (E.G., ICBMS), OR WOULD IT ALSO COVER COMPONENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS? IS IT REALISTIC TO INCLUDE A NON-TRANSFER CLAUSE IN SALT II BUT TO SAY THAT SALT III WILL NOT INCLUDE SUCH A CLAUSE? AS FOR THE PRESENT DRAFTS, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY WILL NOT ACCEPT THE PURE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE, WHEREAS THE US FALLBACK CLAUSE IS IN THE FRG VIEW REALLY A NON-TRANSFER CLAUSE.

6. BLECH STRESSED THAT THE GERMANS WISH TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES BECAUSE THEY TAKE THEM QUITE SERIOUSLY, BUT THAT THEY WISH TO DO SO IN A DISCREET WAY WHICH WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK. HE ALSO EXPLAINED THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 280483

PREFERENCE FOR QUADRIpartite TALKS BY NOTING THAT, IF THERE WERE BILATERAL TALKS, THE FRG WOULD NEVERTHELESS NEED TO COORDINATE POSITIONS WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH. IT SEEMED BETTER TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF GANGING UP.

7. AS FOR THE FRG EMPHASIS ON SPEED IN GETTING THE CONSULTATIONS UNDER WAY, BLECH LEFT THE IMPRESSION OF SOME CONCERN THAT THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS WAS SUCH THAT DELAY MIGHT PREJUDICE THE ABILITY OF THE FRG TO HAVE ITS VIEWS CONSIDERED IN TIME. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MAIN REASON FOR THE INSISTENCE ON RAPID MOVEMENT WAS TO AVOID DISTURBING THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS WHILE FITTING FRG IDEAS INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. MOST IMPORTANT, BLECH SAID, A FIRST ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS WOULD SERVE TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR THE MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION ON DECEMBER 7 AND HELP LEND SUBSTANCE TO THAT DISCUSSION.

8. BLECH SAID THE FRG HAD REVISED ITS ORIGINAL THINKING ON THE LEVEL AT WHICH THE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE HELD. INSTEAD OF STATE SECRETARY VAN WELL, BLECH WILL BE THE FRG SPOKESMAN. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE FRENCH WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY NEW POLITICAL DIRECTOR MERILLON AND HIS DEPUTY PAGNIEZ, AND THAT THE UK PARTICIPANT WOULD BE ANTHONY DUFF.

9. VEST TOLD BLECH THE CLARIFICATION HE HAD PROVIDED WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO WASHINGTON'S CONSIDERATION OF THE GERMAN PROPOSAL. HE ASSURED HIM THAT HIS VIEWS AND CONCERNS WOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY.

10. COMMENT: VEST BELIEVES THAT, IF MR. WARNKE WERE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN AN OPENING ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 280483

ON DECEMBER 1, EVEN IN A LISTENING ROLE, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN SHOWING A DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE USG TO BE RESPONSIVE TO SCHMIDT'S AND GENSCHER'S INITIATIVE. IF THE FRENCH HAVE NOT DECIDED TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THIS ACTIVITY BY THAT TIME, HE BELIEVES THAT EVEN BILATERAL TALKS WOULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE. STOESEL UNQUOTE HABIB

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CAT-B, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 23-Nov-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE280483
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: O:LRFLEISCHED
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: N770008-0125
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 2
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19771125/aaaaaugh.tel
Line Count: 224
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 83b11e13-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 77 BONN 19418, 77 BONN 19263
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 18-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 472016
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FOUR-POWER CONVERSATIONS ON SALT
TAGS: PARM, GE, FR, US, UK
To: WHITE HOUSE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/83b11e13-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009